I. Introduction

Within the range of uses of the word "mean" which are specially connected with communication (uses, that is, of the word "mean" in one or another of what I have called "nonnatural" senses), there are distinctions to be made. Consider the following sentence (S):

"If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading."

(1a) It would be approximately true to say that S means (has as one of its meanings) "If I shall then be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading." It would also perhaps be approximately true to say that S means (has as another of its meanings, in at least one version of English) "If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I shall have no time for reading." Such meaning-specification I shall call the specifications of the timeless meaning(s) of a "complete" utterance-type (which may be a sentence or may be a "sentence-like" nonlinguistic utterance-type, such as a hand-signal).

(1b) It would be true to say that the word "grass" means (loosely speaking) "lawn-material," and also true to say that the word "grass" means "marijuana." Such meaning-specifications I shall call the specifications of the timeless meaning(s) of an "incomplete" utterance-type (which may be a nonsentential word or phrase, or may be a nonlinguistic utterance-type which is analogous to a word or phrase).

1 I am even more indebted to the comments, criticisms, and suggestions which I have been receiving over a considerable period from my colleague Stephen Schiffer than is indicated in the text of this paper.

This paper was delivered at the Philosophy Colloquium at Oberlin College in April 1968. A revised version of material contained in it will, I hope, be part of a book soon to be published by the Harvard University Press.
(2a) Since a complete utterance-type $x$ may have more than one timeless meaning, we need to be able to connect with a particular utterance of $x$ just one of the timeless meanings of $x$ to the exclusion of the others. We need to be able to say, with regard to a particular utterance of $S$, that $S$ meant here (on this occasion) “If I shall be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading,” and that “I shall then be assisting the grass to grow” meant here “I shall be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature.” Such meaning-specifications I shall call specifications of the applied timeless meaning of a complete utterance-type (on a particular occasion of utterance). Such specifications aim to give one the correct reading of a complete utterance-type on a particular occasion of utterance.

(2b) Similarly, we need to be able to specify what I shall call the applied timeless meaning of an incomplete utterance-type; we need to be able to say, with respect to the occurrence of the word “grass” in a particular utterance of $S$, that here, on this occasion, the word “grass” meant (roughly) “lawn-material” and not “marijuana.”

(3) It might be true to say of a particular utterer ($U$) of $S$ that when $U$ uttered $S$, he meant by $S$ (by the words of $S$):

(i) “If I am then dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world,” and possibly, in addition,

(ii) “One advantage of being dead will be that I shall be protected from the horrors of the world.”

If it were true to say of $U$ that, when uttering $S$, he meant by $S$ (i), it would also be true to say of $U$ that he meant by the words, “I shall be helping the grass to grow” (which occur within $S$), “I shall then be dead.”

On the assumption (which I make) that the phrase “helping the grass to grow,” unlike the phrase “pushing up the daisies” is not a recognized idiom, none of the specifications just given of what $U$ meant by $S$ (or by the words “I shall be helping the grass to grow”) would be admissible as specifications of a timeless meaning or of the applied timeless meaning of $S$ (or of the words
constituting the antecedent in $S$). The words "I shall be helping the grass to grow" neither mean nor mean here "I shall be dead."

The kind of meaning-specification just cited I shall call the specification of the occasion-meaning of an utterance-type.

(4) The varieties of meaning-specification so far considered all make use of quotation marks (or, perhaps better, italics) for the specification of what is meant. The fourth and last type to be considered involves, instead, the use of indirect speech. If it were true to say of $U$ that he meant by $S$ (i) (and [ii]), it would also be true to say of him that when he uttered $S$ (by uttering $S$) he meant that if he would then be dead he would not know what was going on in the world, and that when he uttered $S$ he meant that (or part of what he meant was that) one advantage of being dead would be that he would be protected from the horrors of the world. Even if, however, when he uttered $S$ he meant by the words "I shall then be helping the grass to grow" "I shall then be dead," it would not be true to say that he meant by these words that he would then be dead. To have meant that he would then be dead, $U$ would have to have committed himself to its being the case that he would then be dead; and this, when uttering $S$, he has not done.

Type (4) meaning-specifications I shall call specifications of an utterer's occasion-meaning.

We can, then, distinguish four main forms of meaning-specification:

(1) "$x$ (utterance-type) means ‘...’" [Specification of timeless meaning for an utterance-type which is either (1a) complete or (1b) incomplete]

(2) "$x$ (utterance-type) meant here ‘...’" [Specification of applied timeless meaning for an utterance-type which is either (2a) complete or (2b) incomplete]

(3) "$U$ meant by $x$ (utterance-type) ‘...’" [Specification of utterance-type occasion-meaning]

(4) "$U$ meant by uttering $x$ that ..." [Specification of utterer's occasion-meaning]

There is, of course, an element of legislation in the distinction between the four cited linguistic forms; these are not quite so regimented as I am, for convenience, pretending.
In a paper shortly to be published in *Foundations of Language*, entitled “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning,” I consider in some detail the relations between timeless meaning, applied timeless meaning, and what I am now calling utterer’s occasion-meaning. Starting with the assumption that the notion of an utterer’s occasion-meaning can be explicated, in a certain way, in terms of an utterer’s intentions, I argue in support of the thesis that timeless meaning and applied timeless meaning can be explicated in terms of the notion of utterer’s occasion-meaning (together with other notions), and so ultimately in terms of the notion of intention. In that paper I do not distinguish utterance-type occasion-meaning from utterer’s occasion-meaning; but once the distinction is made, it should not prove too difficult to explicate utterance-type occasion-meaning in terms of utterer’s occasion-meaning. The following provisional definition, though inadequate, seems to provide a promising start in this direction.

Let “σ(x)” denote a complete utterance-type (σ) which contains an utterance-type x. x may be complete or incomplete, and may indeed be identical with σ. Let “ϕ” denote an utterance-type. Let “σ(ϕ/x)” denote the result of substituting ϕ for x in σ. Then I propose for consideration the following loosely framed definition.

“By x, U meant ϕ iff (∃σ) {U uttered σ(x), and by uttering σ(x) U meant that ... [the lacuna to be completed by writing σ(ϕ/x)]}.”

My task is, however, to consider further the assumption made in the paper to which I have been referring, that the notion of utterer’s occasion-meaning is explicable, in a certain way, in terms of the notion of utterer’s intention, and the remainder of this paper will concern that topic.

II. INITIAL DEFINITION OF UTTERER’S OCCASION-MEANING

I shall take as a starting-point the account of “nonnatural” meaning which I offered in my article “Meaning” (*Philosophical Review*, 1957), treating this as an attempt to define the notion of utterer’s occasion-meaning. To begin with, I shall take as my
definiendum not the form of expression which is of primary interest, namely (A) "By uttering x U meant that p," but rather the form of expression most prominently discussed in my 1957 article, namely (B) "By uttering x U meant something." My 1957 account, of course, embodied the idea that an adequate definiens for (B) would involve a reference to an intended effect of, or response to, the utterance of x, and that a specification of this intended effect or response would provide the material for answering the question what U meant by uttering x. At a later stage in this paper I shall revert to definiendum (A), and shall attempt to clarify the supposed link between the nature of the intended response and the specification of what U meant by uttering x.

I start, then, by considering the following proposed definition:

"U meant something by uttering x" is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending

(1) A to produce a particular response r
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2).

Two explanatory remarks may be useful. (i) I use the terms "uttering" and "utterance" in an artificially extended way, to apply to any act or performance which is or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning. (ii) To suppose A to produce r "on the basis of" his thinking that U intends him to produce r is to suppose that his thinking that U intends him to produce r is at least part of his reason for producing r, and not merely the cause of his producing r. The third subclause of the definiens is formulated in this way in order to eliminate what would otherwise be a counterexample. If, for subclause (3), we were to substitute

(3a) A to fulfill (1) as a result of his fulfillment of (2)

we should have counter-intuitively to allow that U meant something by doing x if (as might be the case) U did x intending

(1) A to be amused
(2) A to think that U intended him to be amused
(3a) A to be amused (at least partly) as a result of his thinking that U intended him to be amused.
But though A’s thought that U intended him to be amused might be a part-cause of his being amused, it could not be a part of his reason for being amused (one does not, indeed, have reasons for being amused). So the adoption of (3) rather than of (3a) excludes this case.

I shall consider objections to this account of utterer's occasion-meaning under two main heads: first, those which purport to show that the definiens is too weak, that it lets in too much; and second, those which purport to show that the definiens is too strong, that it excludes clear cases of utterer's occasion-meaning. To meet some of these objections I shall at various stages offer redefinitions of the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning; each such redefinition is to be regarded as being superseded by its successor.

III. Alleged Counterexamples Directed against the Sufficiency of the Suggested Analysans

(i) (Urmson)² There is a range of examples connected with the provision by U (the utterer) of an inducement, or supposed inducement, so that A (the recipient, or audience) shall perform some action. Suppose a prisoner of war to be thought by his captors to possess some information which they want him to reveal; he knows that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. The appropriate analysans for “They meant something by applying the thumbscrews (that he should tell them what they wanted to know)” are fulfilled:

(1) They applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of the victim;
(2) They intended that he should recognize (know, think) that they applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing this response;
(3) They intended that the prisoner’s recognition (thought) that they had the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of his reason for producing the response mentioned.

²J. O. Urmson, in conversation.
If in general to specify in (1) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that the torturers meant something by applying the thumbscrews, but also to say that they meant that he should (was to) tell them what they wished to know. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that they meant him to tell. A similar apparent counterexample can be constructed out of a case of bribery (Urmson's original example).

A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of the two following examples:

(a) I go into a tobacconist's shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to see the color of my money before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant.

(b) I go to my regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand X, the price of which is distinctive (say 43 cents). I say nothing, but put down 43 cents. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43 cents I meant something—namely, that I wanted a packet of brand X. I have at the same time provided an inducement.

The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money), whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to the torture example. So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amended accordingly (Redefinition I):

"U meant something by uttering x" is true iff:

(1) U intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response in A
(2) U intended A to recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intended to produce that response
(3) U intended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (1).
While this might cope with this range of counterexamples, there are others for which it is insufficient.

(ii) (Stamp, Strawson, Schiffer)³

(a) (Stamp) A man is playing bridge against his boss. He wants to earn his boss's favor, and for this reason he wants his boss to win, and furthermore he wants his boss to know that he wants him to win (his boss likes that kind of self-effacement). He does not want to do anything too blatant, however, like telling his boss by word of mouth, or in effect telling him by some action amounting to a signal, for fear the boss might be offended by his crudity. So he puts into operation the following plan: when he gets a good hand, he smiles in a certain way; the smile is very like, but not quite like, a spontaneous smile of pleasure. He intends his boss to detect the difference and to argue as follows: "That was not a genuine give-away smile, but the simulation of such a smile. That sort of simulation might be a bluff (on a weak hand), but this is bridge, not poker, and he would not want to get the better of me, his boss, by such an impropriety. So probably he has a good hand, and, wanting me to win, he hoped I would learn that he has a good hand by taking his smile as a spontaneous give-away. That being so, I shall not raise my partner's bid."

In such a case, I do not think one would want to say that the employee had meant, by his smile (or by smiling), that he had a good hand, nor indeed that he had meant anything at all. Yet the conditions so far listed are fulfilled. When producing the smile,

(1) The employee intended that the boss should think that the employee had a good hand
(2) The employee intended that the boss should think, at least in part because of the smile, that the employee intended the boss to think that the hand was a good one
(3) The employee intended that at least part of the boss's reason for thinking that the hand was a good one should be that the employee wanted him to think just that.

(b) To deal with an example similar to that just cited, Strawson proposed that the analysans might be restricted by the addition of a further condition, namely that the utterer $U$ should utter $x$ not only, as already provided, with the intention that $A$ should think that the utterer intends to obtain a certain response from $A$, but also with the intention that $A$ should think (recognize) that $U$ has the intention just mentioned. In the current example, the boss is intended to think that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one, but he is not intended to think that he is intended to think that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one; he is intended to think that it is only as a result of being too clever for the employee that he has learned that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one; he is to think that he was supposed to take the smile as a spontaneous give-away.

(c) (Schiffer) A more or less parallel example, where the intended response is a practical one, can be constructed, which seems to show the need for the addition of a fifth condition. The utterer $U$ is in a room with a man $A$ who is notoriously avaricious, but who also has a certain pride. $U$ wants to get rid of $A$. So $U$, in full view of $A$, tosses a five-pound note out of the window. He intends that $A$ should think as follows: "$U$ wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall run after the £5 note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his performance). But I am not going to demean myself by going after the banknote; I shall go, but I shall go because he wants me to go. I do not care to be where I am not wanted." In this example, counterparts of all four of the conditions so far suggested for the analysans are fulfilled; yet, here again, I do not think that one would want to say that $U$ had meant something by throwing the banknote out of the window; that he had meant, for example, that $A$ was to (should) go away. The four conditions which are fulfilled are statable as follows:

$U$ uttered $x$ (threw the banknote) with the intention

1. that $A$ should leave the room
2. that $A$ should think (at least partly on the basis of $x$) that $U$ had intention (1)
(3) that A should think that U had intention (2)
(4) that in the fulfillment of intention (1), at least part of A’s reason for acting should be that he thought that U had intention (1) (that is, that intention [2] is fulfilled).

So unless this utterance is to qualify as having meant something, yet a further restriction is required. A feature of this example seems to be that though A’s leaving the room was intended by U to be based on A’s thought that U wanted him to leave the room, U did not intend A to recognize that U intended A’s departure to be so based. A was intended to think that U’s purpose was to get him to leave in pursuit of the £5 note. So the needed restriction is suggested as being that U should intend:

(5) that A should think (recognize) that U intended that (4).

We can now formulate the general form of these suggested conditions (Redefinition II, Version A):

“U meant something by x” is true iff U uttered x intending thereby:

(1) that A should produce response r
(2) that A should, at least partly on the basis of x, think that U intended (1)
(3) that A should think that U intended (2)
(4) that A’s production of r should be based (at least in part) on A’s thought that U intended that (1) (that is, on A’s fulfillment of [2])
(5) that A should think that U intended (4).

A notable fact about this analysans is that at several points it exhibits the following feature: U’s n\textsuperscript{th} “sub-intention” is specified as an intention that A should think that U has his n-1\textsuperscript{th} “sub-intention.” The presence of this feature has led to the suggestion that the analysis of meaning (on these lines) is infinitely or indefinitely regressive, that further counterexamples could always be found, however complex the suggested analysans, to force the incorporation of further clauses which exhibit this feature; but that such a regress might/will be virtuous, not vicious; it might/will be as harmless as a regress proceeding from “Z knows that p” to “Z knows that Z knows that p” to . . . .
I am not sure just how innocent such a regress in the analysans would be. It certainly would not exhibit the kind of circularity, at least prima facie strongly objectionable, which would be involved in giving, for example, a definiens for "U meant that p" which at some point reintroduced the expression "U meant that p," or introduced the expression "U meant that q." On the other hand, it would not be so obviously harmless as it would be to suppose that whenever it is correct to say "it is true that p," it is also correct to say "it is true that it is true that p," and so on; or as harmless as it would be to suppose that if Z satisfies the conditions for knowing that p, he also satisfies the condition for knowing that he knows that p. In such cases, no extra conditions would be required for the truth of an iteration of, for example, "he knows that" over and above those required for the truth of the sentence with respect to which the iteration is made. But the regressive character of the analysans for "U meant something by x" is designed to meet possible counterexamples at each stage, so each additional clause imposes a restriction, requires that a further condition be fulfilled. One might ask whether, for example, on the assumption that it is always possible to know that p without knowing that one knows that p, it would be legitimate to define "Z super-knows that p" by the open set of conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{ Z knows that } p \\
(2) & \text{ Z knows that } (1) \\
(3) & \text{ Z knows that } (2) \text{ and so forth.}
\end{align*}
\]

There is, however, the possibility that no decision is required on this question, since it might be that the threatened regress cannot arise.

It does not seem easy to construct examples which will force the addition of clauses involving further iterations of "U intended A to think that . . . ." The following is an attempt by Schiffer. U sings "Tipperary" in a raucous voice with the intention of getting A to leave the room; A is supposed to recognize (and to know that he is intended to recognize) that U wants to get rid of A. U, moreover, intends that A shall, in the event, leave because he recognizes U's intention that he shall go. U's scheme is that A should (wrongly) think that U intends A to think that U intends to
get rid of A by means of the recognition of U's intention that A should go. In other words A is supposed to argue: "U intends me to think that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing, but he really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing." The fact that A, while thinking he is seeing through U's plans, is really conforming to them, is suggested as precluding one from saying, here, that U meant by the singing that A should go.

But once one tries to fill in the detail of this description, the example becomes baffling. How is A supposed to reach the idea that U wants him to think that U intends to get rid of him by the singing? One might suppose that U sings in a particular nasal tone which he knows not to be displeasing to A, though it is to most people. A knows that U knows this tone not to be displeasing to A, but thinks (wrongly) that U does not know that A knows this. A might then be supposed to argue: "He cannot want to drive me out by his singing, since he knows that this nasal tone is not displeasing to me. He does not know, however, that I know he knows this, so maybe he wants me to think that he intends to drive me out by his singing." At this point one would expect A to be completely at a loss to explain U's performance; I see no reason at all why A should then suppose that U really wants to get rid of him in some other way.

Whether or not this example could be made to work, its complexity is enormous, and any attempt to introduce yet further restrictions would involve greater complexities still. It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires those to whom communications or near-communications are addressed to be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions. At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of A by U will be impractically difficult; and I suspect the limit was reached (if not exceeded) in the examples which prompted the addition of a fourth and fifth condition. So U could not have the intentions required of him in order to force the addition of further restrictions. Not only are
the calculations he would be requiring of A too difficult, but it
would be impossible for U to find cues to indicate to A that the
calculations should be made, even if they were within A's compass.
So one is tempted to conclude that no regress is involved.

But even should this conclusion be correct, we seem to be left
with an uncomfortable situation. For though we may know that
we do not need an infinite series of "backward-looking" sub-
clauses, we cannot say just how many such subclauses are required.
Indeed, it looks as if the definitional expansion of "By uttering
x U meant something" might have to vary from case to case,
depending on such things as the nature of the intended response,
the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is
made, and the intelligence of the utterer and of the audience. It is
dubious whether such variation can be acceptable.

This difficulty would be avoided if we could eliminate potential
counterexamples not by requiring U to have certain additional
("backward-looking") intentions, but rather by requiring U not
to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions.
Potential counterexamples of the kind with which we are at
present concerned all involve the construction of a situation in
which U intends A, in the reflection process by which A is supposed
to reach his response, both to rely on some "inference-element"
(some premise or some inferential step) E and also to think that
U intends A not to rely on E. Why not, then, eliminate such
potential counterexamples by a single clause which prohibits U
from having this kind of complex intention?

So we reach Redefinition II, Version B:

"U meant something by uttering x" is true iff (for some A and for
some r):

(a) U uttered x intending
   (1) A to produce r
   (2) A to think U to intend (1)
   (3) A's fulfillment of (1) to be based on A's fulfillment of (2)

(b) there is no inference-element E such that U uttered x
    intending both (1') that A's determination of r should
    rely on E and (2') that A should think U to intend that
    (1') be false.
An American soldier in the Second World War is captured by Italian troops. He wishes to get the troops to believe that he is a German officer, in order to get them to release him. What he would like to do is to tell them in German or Italian that he is a German officer, but he does not know enough German or Italian to do that. So he "as it were, attempts to put on a show of telling them that he is a German officer" by reciting the only line of German that he knows, a line he learned at school: "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen." He intends to produce a certain response in his captors, namely that they should believe him to be a German officer, and he intends to produce this response by means of their recognition of his intention to produce it. Nevertheless, Searle maintains, it is false that when he says "Kennst du das Land" what he means is "I am a German officer" (or even the German version of "I am a German officer") because what the words mean is "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom." He uses this example to support a claim that something is missing from my account of meaning; this would (I think he thinks) be improved if it were supplemented as follows (my conjecture): "U meant something by x" means "U intended to produce in A a certain effect by means of the recognition of U's intention to produce that effect, and (if the utterance of x is the utterance of a sentence) U intends A's recognition of U's intention (to produce the effect) to be achieved by means of the recognition that the sentence uttered is conventionally used to produce such an effect."

Now even if I should be here faced with a genuine counter-example, I should be very reluctant to take the way out which I suspect was being offered me. (It is difficult to tell whether this is what was being offered, since Searle is primarily concerned with the characterization of a particular speech-act (promising), not with a general discussion of the nature of meaning; and he was mainly concerned to adapt my account of meaning to his current purpose, not to amend it so as to be better suited to its avowed end.) Of course I would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence) the speaker's

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4 John R. Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in Philosophy in America, ed. by Max Black (Ithaca, N. Y., 1963), pp. 221-239.
intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed my account of "non-conventional implicature" depends on this idea). But as I indicated earlier, I would like, if I can, to treat meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a special case of meaning something by an utterance (in my extended sense of utterance), and to treat a conventional correlation between a sentence and a specific response as providing only one of the ways in which an utterance may be correlated with a response.

Is the present example, however, a genuine counterexample? It seems to me that the imaginary situation is underdescribed, and that there are perhaps three different cases to be considered.

(1) The situation might be such that the only real chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the American soldier speak his German line, suppose him to be a German officer, would be if they were to argue as follows: "He has just spoken in German (perhaps in an authoritative tone); we don't know any German, and we have no idea what he has been trying to tell us, but if he speaks German, then the most likely possibility is that he is a German officer—what other Germans would be in this part of the world?" If the situation was such that the Italians were likely to argue like that, and the American knew that to be so, then it would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he spoke, that they should argue like that. As I recently remarked, one cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved. But if the American's intention was as just described, then he certainly would not, by my account, be meaning that he is a German officer; for though he would intend the Italians to believe him to be a German officer, he would not be intending them to believe this on the basis of their recognition of his intention. And it seems to me that though this is not how Searle wished the example to be taken, it would be much the most likely situation to have obtained.

(2) I think Searle wanted us to suppose that the American hoped that the Italians would reach a belief that he was a German officer via a belief that the words which he uttered were the Ger-
man for “I am a German officer” (though it is not easy to see how to build up the context of utterance so as to give him any basis for this hope). Now it becomes doubtful whether, after all, it is right to say that the American did not mean “I am a German officer.” Consider the following example. The proprietor of a shop full of knickknacks for tourists is standing in his doorway in Port Said, sees a British visitor, and in dulcet tones and with an alluring smile says to him the Arabic for “You pig of an Englishman.” I should be quite inclined to say that he had meant that the visitor was to come in, or something of the sort. I would not of course be in the least inclined to say that he had meant by the words which he uttered that the visitor was to come in; and to point out that the German line means not “I am a German officer” but “Knowest thou the land” is not relevant. If the American could be said to have meant that he was a German officer, he would have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particular way; just as the Port Said shop-merchant would mean that the visitor was to come in by saying what he said, or by speaking to the visitor in the way he did.

(3) It has been suggested, however, that it makes a difference whether U merely intends A to think that a particular sentence has a certain meaning which it does not in fact have, or whether he also intends him to think of himself as supposed to make use of his (mistaken) thought that it has this meaning in reaching a belief about U’s intentions. The Port Said merchant is perhaps thought of as not intending the visitor to think of himself in this way; the visitor is not to suppose that the merchant thinks he can speak Arabic. But if A is intended to think that U expects A to understand the sentence spoken and is intended to attribute to it a meaning which U knows it does not have, then the utterer should not be described as meaning something by his utterance. I do not see the force of this contention, nor indeed do I find it easy to apply the distinction which it makes. Consider just one example. I have been listening to a French lesson being given to the small daughter of a friend. I noticed that she thinks that a certain sentence in French means “Help yourself to a piece of cake,” though in fact it means something quite different. When there is some cake in the vicinity, I address to her this French sentence, and as I intended,
she helps herself. I intended her to think (and to think that I intended her to think) that the sentence uttered by me meant "Help yourself to some cake"; and I would say that the fact that the sentence meant, and was known by me to mean something quite different is no obstacle to my having meant something by my utterance (namely, that she was to have some cake). Put in a more general form the point seems to be as follows. Characteristically, an utterer intends an audience to recognize (and to think himself intended to recognize) some "crucial" feature $F$, and to think of $F$ (and to think himself intended to think of $F$) as correlated in a certain way with some response which the utterer intends the audience to produce. It does not matter so far as the attribution of the speaker's meaning is concerned, whether $F$ is thought by $U$ to be really correlated in that way with the response or not; though of course in the normal case $U$ will think $F$ to be so correlated.

Suppose, however, we fill in the detail of the "American soldier" case, so as to suppose he accompanies "Kennst du das Land" with gesticulations, chest-thumping, and so forth; he might then hope to succeed in conveying to his listeners that he intends them to understand the German sentence, to learn from the particular German sentence that the American intends them to think that he is a German officer (whereas really of course the American does not expect them to learn that way, but only by assuming, on the basis of the situation and the character of the American's performance, that he must be trying to tell them that he is a German officer). Perhaps in that case, we should be disinclined to say that the American meant that he was a German officer, and ready to say only that he meant them to think that he was a German officer.

How can this example be differentiated from the "little girl" example? I would like to suggest a revised set of conditions for "$U$ meant something by $x$" (Redefinition III, Version A):

Ranges of variables: $A$: audiences

$f$: features of utterance

$r$: responses

$c$: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional)
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(∃A) (∃f) (∃r) (∃e):

U uttered x intending (1) A to think x possesses f
(2) A to think U intends (1)
(3) A to think of f as correlated in way e with the type to which r belongs
(4) A to think U intends (3)
(5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A to produce r
(6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r
(7) A to think U intends (6).

In the case of the “little girl” there is a single feature f (that of being an utterance of a particular French sentence) with respect to which A has all the first four intentions. (The only thing wrong is that this feature is not in fact correlated conventionally with the intended responses, and this does not disqualify the utterance from being one by which U means something.)

In the “American soldier” case there is no such single feature f. The captors are intended (1) to recognize, and go by, feature \( f_1 \) (x’s being a bit of German and being uttered with certain gestures, and so forth) but (2) to think that they are intended to recognize x as having \( f_2 \) (as being a particular German sentence).

The revised set of conditions also takes care of the earlier bridge example. The boss is intended to recognize x as having f (being a fake smile) but not to think that he is so intended. So intention (2) on our revised list is absent. And so we do not need the condition previously added to eliminate this example. I think, however, that condition (7) (the old condition [5]) is still needed to eliminate the “£5 note” example, unless it can be replaced by a general “anti-deception” clause. It may be that such replacement is possible; it may be that the “backward-looking” subclauses (2), (4), and (7) can be omitted, and replaced by the prohibitive clause which figures in Redefinition II, Version B. We have then to consider the merits of Redefinition III, Version B, the definiens of which will run as follows:
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(∃A) (∃f) (∃r) (∃e): (a) U uttered x intending

(1) A to think x possesses f
(2) A to think f correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs
(3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that U intends A
to produce r
(4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r,

and (b) there is no inference-element E such that U intends both

(1') A in his determination of r to rely on E
(2') A to think U to intend (1') to be false.

IV. EXAMPLES DIRECTED TOWARD SHOWING THE THREE-PRONG ANALYSANS TOO STRONG

Let us (for simplicity) revert to the original analysans of “U
means something by uttering x,” and abbreviate

“U utters x intending A: (1) to produce r
(2) to think U intends A to produce r
(3) to think U intends the fulfillment of (1) to be based on the fulfill-
ment of (2)”

to “U utters x M-intending that A produce r.”

In my original article, I supposed that the identification of what
U meant by x would turn on the identification of the M-intended
response or effect. In particular I supposed that generic differences
in type of response would be connected with generic differences
within what is meant. To take two central examples, I supposed
(a) “U meant by x that so-and-so is the case” would (roughly
speaking) be explicated by “U uttered x M-intending to produce
in A the belief that so-and-so”; (b) “U meant by x that A should
do such-and-such” would be explicated by “U uttered x M-
intending to produce in A the doing of such-and-such.” Indicative
or quasi-indicative utterances are connected with the generation of beliefs, imperative or quasi-imperative utterances are connected with the generation of actions.

I wish to direct our consideration to the emendation of this idea: to substitute in the account of imperative or quasi-imperative utterances, as the direct, \( M \)-intended response, “intention on the part of \( A \) to do such-and-such” (vice “\( A \)’s doing such-and-such”). This has the advantages (1) that symmetry is achieved, in that the \( M \)-intended response will be a propositional attitude in both cases (indicative and imperative); (2) that it accommodates the fact that agreement (“yes,” “all right”) in the case of “The engine has stopped” signifies belief, and in the case of “Stop the engine” signifies intention. Of course action is the ultimate objective of the speaker. Cases of immediate response by acting are treatable, however, as special cases of forming an intention—namely, the intention with which the agent acts. Imperatives always call for intentional action.

Alleged counterexamples are best seen as attempts to raise trouble, not for the suggested analysis for “\( U \) means something by uttering \( x \),” but for this analysis when supplemented by the kind of detail just mentioned, so as to offer an outline of an account of “By uttering \( x \), \( U \) means (meant) that . . . .” In particular, it is suggested that to explicate “By uttering \( x \), \( U \) meant that so-and-so is the case” by “\( U \) uttered \( x \) \( M \)-intending to produce in \( A \) the belief that so-and-so” is to select as explicans a condition that is too strong. We need to be able to say on occasion that \( U \) meant that so-and-so, without committing ourselves to the proposition that \( U \) \( M \)-intended to produce a belief that so-and-so.

The following examples seem to present difficulties:

Examinee: Q: “When was the Battle of Waterloo”?
A: “1815” (“1816”)

Here the examinee meant that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 (1816) but hardly \( M \)-intended to induce a belief to that effect in his examiner. The examiner’s beliefs (whatever they may be) are naturally to be thought of by the examinee as independent of candidates’ answers. The \( M \)-intended effect is (perhaps) that the examiner knows or thinks that the examinee thinks the Battle
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of Waterloo was fought in 1815 (1816); or (perhaps) that the examiner knows whether the examinee knows the correct answer to the question. (Perhaps the former is the direct, and the latter the indirect, intended effect).

Confession (some cases):

Mother: “It's no good denying it: you broke the window, didn’t you?”
Child: “Yes, I did.”

Here the child knows his mother already thinks he broke the window; what she wants is that he should say that he did. Perhaps the \( M \)-intended effect, then, is that the mother should think the child willing to say that he did (what does “say” mean here—how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing not to pretend that he did not break the window (not to say things or perform acts intended to induce the belief that the child did not break the window). (Confession is perhaps a sophisticated and ritual case.)

Reminding: Q: “Let me see, what was that girl’s name?”
A: “Rose” (or produces a rose).

The questioner is here to be presumed already to believe that the girl’s name is Rose (at least in a dispositional sense); it has just slipped his mind. The intended effect seems to be that \( A \) should have it in mind that her name is Rose.

Review of facts: Both speaker and hearer are to be supposed already to believe that \( p \) (\( q \), and so forth). The intended effect again seems to be that \( A \) (and perhaps \( U \) also) should have “the facts” in mind (altogether).

Conclusion of argument: \( p, q \), therefore \( r \) (from already stated premises).

While \( U \) intends that \( A \) should think that \( r \), he does not expect (and so intend) \( A \) to reach a belief that \( r \) on the basis of \( U \)'s intention that he should reach it. The premises, not trust in \( U \), are supposed to do the work.

The countersuggestible man: \( A \) regards \( U \) as being, in certain areas, almost invariably mistaken, or as being someone with whom he
cannot bear to be in agreement. *U* knows this. *U* says "My mother thinks very highly of you" with the intention that *A* should (on the strength of what *U* says) think that *U*'s mother has a low opinion of him. Here there is some inclination to say that, despite *U*'s intention that *A* should think *U*'s mother thinks ill of him, what *U* meant was that *U*'s mother thinks well of *A*.

These examples raise two related difficulties.

(i) There is some difficulty in supposing that the indicative form is conventionally tied to indicating that the speaker is *M*-intending to induce a certain belief in his audience, if there are quite normal occurrences of the indicative mood for which the speaker's intentions are different, in which he is not *M*-intending (nor would be taken to be *M*-intending) to induce a belief (for example, in reminding). Yet, on the other side, it seems difficult to suppose that the function of the indicative mood has nothing to do with the inducement of belief. The indication of the speaker's intention that his audience should act (or form an intention to act) is plausibly, if not unavoidably, to be regarded as by convention the function of the imperative mood; surely the function of the indicative ought to be analogous. What is the alternative to the suggested connection with an intention to induce a belief?

The difficulty here might be met by distinguishing questions about what an indicative sentence means and questions about what a *speaker* means. One might suggest that a full specification of sentence meaning (for indicative sentences) involves reference to the fact that the indicative form conventionally signifies an intention on the part of the utterer to induce a belief; but that it may well be the case that the speaker's meaning does not coincide with the meaning of the sentence he utters. It may be clear that, though he uses a device which conventionally indicates an intention on his part to induce a belief, *in this case* he has not this but some other intention. This is perhaps reinforceable by pointing out that *any* device the primary (standard) function of which is to indicate the speaker's intention to induce a belief that *p* could in appropriate circumstances be easily and intelligibly employed for related purposes, for example (as in the "examinee" example), to indicate that the *speaker* believes that *p*. The problem then would be to exhibit the alleged counterexamples as natural adaptations of a
device or form primarily connected with the indication of an intention to induce a belief.

I think we would want if possible to avoid treating the counterexamples as extended uses of the indicative form, and to find a more generally applicable function for that form. In any case, the second difficulty is more serious.

(2) Even if we can preserve the idea that the indicative form is tied by convention to the indication of a speaker’s intention to induce a belief, we should have to allow that the speaker’s meaning will be different for different occurrences of the same indicative sentence. (Indeed, this is required by the suggested solution for difficulty [1]). We shall have to allow this if differences in intended response involve differences in speaker’s meaning. But it is not very plausible to say that if U says, “The Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815”:

(1) as a schoolmaster (intending to induce a belief)
(2) as an examinee
(3) as a schoolmaster in revision class,

U would mean something different by uttering this sentence on the three occasions. Even if the examinee M-intends to induce a belief that he (the examinee) thinks the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, it does not seem attractive to say that when he said “Waterloo was fought in 1815” he meant that he thought that Waterloo was fought in 1815 (unlike the schoolmaster teaching the period for the first time).

We might attempt to deal with some of the examples (for example, reminding, fact-reviewing) by supposing the standard M-intended effect to be not just a belief but an “activated belief” (that A should be in a state of believing that p and having it in mind that p). One may fall short of this in three ways: one may

(1) neither believe that p nor have it in mind that p
(2) believe that p but not have it in mind that p
(3) not believe that p, but have it in mind that p.

So one who reminds intends the same final response as one who informs, but is intending to remedy a different deficiency.

This (even for the examples for which it seems promising) runs
into a new difficulty. If \( U \) says (remindingly) "Waterloo was fought in 1815," two of my conditions are fulfilled:

1. \( U \) intends to induce in \( A \) the activated belief that Waterloo was fought in 1815
2. \( U \) intends \( A \) to recognize that (1).

But if the date of Waterloo was "on the tip of \( A \)'s tongue" (as it might be), \( U \) cannot expect (and so cannot intend) that \( A \)'s activated belief will be produced via \( A \)'s recognition that \( U \) intends to produce it. If \( A \) already believes (though has momentarily forgotten) that Waterloo was fought in 1815, then the mention of this date will induce the activated belief, regardless of \( U \)'s intention to produce it.

This suggests dropping the requirement (for speaker's meaning) that \( U \) should intend \( A \)'s production of response to be based on \( A \)'s recognition of \( U \)'s intention that \( A \) should produce the response; it suggests the retention merely of conditions (1) and (2) above. But this will not do: there are examples which require this condition.

(a) Herod, showing Salome the head of St. John the Baptist, cannot, I think, be said to have meant that St. John the Baptist was dead.

(b) Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation).

In (b) the displayer could mean (1) that he cannot play squash or (dubiously) (2) that he has a bad leg (the bandages might be fake) but not (3) that his leg is bandaged.

The third condition seems to be required in order to protect us from counter-intuitive results in these cases.

Possible remedies

(i) We might retain the idea that the intended effect or response (for cases of meaning that it is the case that \( p \)—indicative type) is activated belief, retaining in view the distinction between reaching
this state (1) from assurance-deficiency (2) from attention-deficiency; and stipulate that the third condition (that U intends the response to be elicited on the basis of a recognition of his intention to elicit that response) is operative only when U intends to elicit activated belief by eliminating assurance-deficiency, not when he intends to do so by eliminating attention-deficiency. This idea might perhaps be extended to apply to imperative types of cases, too, provided that we can find cases of reminding someone to do something (restoring him to activated intention) in which U’s intention that A should reach the state is similarly otiose, in which it is not to be expected that A’s reaching the activated intention will be dependent on his recognition that U intends him to reach it. So the definition might read roughly as follows:

(*ψ is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude ψ from a given range of propositional attitudes)

“U means by uttering x that *ψp” = “U utters x intending

(1) that A should actively ψ that p
(2) that A should recognize that U intends (1)
and (unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy attention-deficiency)
(3) that the fulfillment of (1) should be based on the fulfillment of (2).”

This remedy does not, however, cope with (1) the “examinee” example, (2) the “confession” cases, or (3) the countersuggestible man.

(ii) Since, when U does intend, by uttering x, to promote in A the belief that p, it is standardly requisite that A should (and should be intended to) think that U thinks that p (otherwise A will not think that p), why not make the direct intended effect not that A should think that p, but that A should think that U thinks that p? In many but not all cases, U will intend A to pass, from thinking that U thinks that p, to thinking that p himself (“informing” cases). But such an effect is to be thought of as indirect (even though often of prime interest).
We can now retain the third condition, since even in reminding cases \( A \) may be expected to think \( U \)'s intention that \( A \) should think that \( U \) thinks that \( p \) to be relevant to the question whether \( A \) is to think that \( U \) thinks that \( p \). We have coped, not only with the reminding example, but also with the examinee example and with the countersuggestible man (who is intended to think that \( U \) thinks that \( p \), though not to think that \( p \) himself). And though the fact-review example is not yet provided for (since \( A \) may be thought of as already knowing that \( U \) thinks that \( p \)), if we are understanding “\( U \) believes that \( p \)” as “\( U \) has the activated belief that \( p \),” this example can be accommodated, too. \( A \), though he is to be supposed to know that \( U \) believes that \( p \), does not until \( U \) speaks know that \( U \) has it in mind that \( p \).

But while a solution along these lines may be acceptable for indicative-type cases, it cannot be generalized to all non-indicative cases. Contrast:

\((a)\) “You shall not cross the barrier.”
\((b)\) “Do not cross the barrier.”

When uttering \((a)\), \( U \) would characteristically intend \( A \) to think that \( U \) intends that \( A \) shall not cross the barrier; but it seems that a specification of \( U \)'s meaning, for a normal utterance of \((b)\), would be incompletely explicited unless it is stated that \( U \) intends \( A \) not merely to think that \( U \) intends that \( A \) shall not cross the barrier, but also himself to form the intention not to cross.

Let us then draw a distinction between what I might call “purely exhibitive” utterances (utterances by which the utterer \( U \) intends to impart a belief that he \( [U] \) has a certain propositional attitude), and utterances which are not only exhibitive but also what I might call “protreptic” (that is, utterances by which \( U \) intends, via imparting the belief that he \( [U] \) has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer).

We reach, then, Redefinition IV, Version A:

“By uttering \( x \ U \) meant that \( \#p \)” is true iff
\((\exists A) (\exists f) (\exists c):\)
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\[ U \text{ uttered } \rightarrow \text{intending (1)} \]

\( (2) \]

\( (3) \]

\( (4) \) \( \text{[as for III(A), with “ψ-ing that } p \text{” substituted for “r”]} \)

\( (5) \]

\( (6) \]

\( (7) \]

and (for some cases)

\( (8) \) \( A, \text{on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to } ψ \text{ that } p. \)

Whether a substitution-instance of subclause (8) is to appear in the expansion of a statement of the form represented in the definiendum will depend on the nature of the substitution for “*ψ*” which that statement incorporates.

We can also reach Redefinition IV, Version B, by adding what appears above as subclause (8) to the definiens of III(B) as subclause (a) (5), together with a modification of clause (b) of III(B) to take into account that the intended response \( r \) is now specified in terms of the idea of ψ-ing that \( p \).

Whether either version of Redefinition IV is correct as it stands depends crucially on the view to be taken of an imperative version of the “countersuggestible man” example. Mr. A, wishing to be relieved of the immediate presence of Mrs. A, but regarding her as being, so far as he is concerned, countersuggestible, says to her, “Now, dear, keep me company for a little.” Would it be correct to say that Mr. A, who clearly did not mean Mrs. A to keep him company, meant by his remark that she was to (should) keep him company? If the answer is “yes,” the Redefinition IV is inadequate, since according to it to have meant that Mrs. A was to keep him company, Mr. A would have had to intend that she form the intention to keep him company, an intention which he certainly did not have. Emendation, however, would not be difficult; we alter the new subclause from “\( A, \text{on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to } ψ \text{ to that } p \)” to “\( A, \text{on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), to think } U \text{ to } \intend A \text{ to } ψ \text{ that } p. \)” If, however, the answer is “no,” then Redefinition IV is left intact.
There are various examples of utterances by which the utterer could correctly be said to have meant something (to have meant that so-and-so), such that there is no actual person or set of persons whom the utterer is addressing and in whom he intends to induce a response. The range of these examples includes, or might be thought to include, such items as the posting of notices, like “Keep out” or “This bridge is dangerous,” entries in diaries, the writing of notes to clarify one’s thoughts when working on some problem, soliloquizing, rehearsing a part in a projected conversation, and silent thinking. At least some of these examples are unprovided for in the definitions so far proposed.

The examples which my account should cover fall into three groups:

(a) Utterances for which the utterer thinks there may (now or later) be an audience. U may think that some particular person, for example, himself at a future date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U’s utterance; or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who is or will be an auditor of his utterance.

(b) Utterances which the utterer knows not to be addressed to any actual audience, but which the utterer pretends to address to some particular person or type of person, or which he thinks of as being addressed to some imagined audience or type of audience (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of his part in a projected conversation).

(c) Utterances (including “internal” utterances) with respect to which the utterer neither thinks it possible that there may be an actual audience nor imagines himself as addressing an audience, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of audience were it the case that such an audience was present. In the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of an audience will have to be interpreted liberally, as being the idea of there being an audience for a public counterpart of the
utterer's internal speech. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking fall outside the scope of my account. When verbal thoughts merely pass through my head as distinct from being “framed” by me, it is inappropriate to talk of me as having meant something by them; I am, perhaps, in such cases more like a listener than a speaker.

I shall propose a final redefinition which I hope will account for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as special cases the range of examples in which there is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual audience. This redefinition will be relatively informal; I could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension.

Let “ϕ” (and φ’) range over properties of persons (possible audiences); appropriate substituends for “ϕ” (and φ’) will include such diverse expressions as “is a passer-by,” “is a passer-by who sees this notice,” “is a native English speaker,” “is identical with Jones.” As will be seen, for U to mean something it will have to be possible to identify the value of “ϕ” (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection.

Redefinition V

“U meant by uttering x that *ψφ” is true iff

(∃ϕ) (∃f) (∃c):

I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has ϕ would think that

(1) x has f
(2) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that ϕ
(3) (∃φ’): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ’ would think, via thinking (1) and (2), that Uψ’s that ϕ
(4) in view of (3), Uψ’s that ϕ;

and

II. (operative only for certain substituends for “*ψ”) U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has ϕ, he would via thinking (4), himself ψ that ϕ;
and

III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element $E$, $U$ intends $x$ to be such that anyone who has $\phi$ will both

(i') rely on $E$ in coming to $\psi^+$ that $p$

and (2') think that ($3\phi'$): $U$ intends $x$ to be such that anyone who has $\phi'$ will come to $\psi^+$ that $p$ without relying on $E$.

Notes: (1) "$\psi^+$" is to be read as "$\psi$" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that $U$'s" if Clause II is non-operative.

(2) We need to use both "$\phi$" and "$\phi'$," since we do not wish to require that $U$ should intend his possible audience to think of $U$'s possible audience under the same description as $U$ does himself.

Explanatory comments:

(1) It is essential that the intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as $U$'s intention "that should there be anyone who has $\phi$, he would (will) . . ." rather than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as $U$'s intention "that $x$ should be such that, should anyone be $\phi$, he would . . . ." If we adopt the latter specification, we shall be open to an objection raised by Schiffer, as can be shown with the aid of an example of the same kind as his. Suppose that, infuriated by an afternoon with my mother-in-law, when I am alone after her departure I relieve my feelings by saying, aloud and passionately, "Don’t you ever come near me again." It will no doubt be essential to my momentary well-being that I should speak with the intention that my remark be such that were my mother-in-law present, she would form the intention not to come near me again. It would, however, be unacceptable if it were represented as following from my having this intention that I meant that she was never to come near me again; for it is false that, in the circumstances, I meant this by my remark. The redefinition as formulated avoids this difficulty.

(2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens of the latest redefinition, ($3\phi'$): $U$ intends $x$ to be such that anyone who is $\phi$ will think . . . , and suppose that the value of "$\phi$" which $U$ has in mind is the property of being identical with a particular person $A$. Then it will follow that $U$ intends $A$ to think . . . ; and given the further
condition, fulfilled in any normal case, that \( U \) intends \( A \) to think that he (\( A \)) is the intended audience, we are assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens of \( IV(B) \) is inferrible by the rule of existential generalization (assuming the legitimacy of this application of E. G. to a statement the expression of which contains such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and "think"). I think it can also be shown that, for any case in which there is an actual audience who knows that he is the intended audience, if the definiens \( IV(B) \) is true then the definiens of \( V \) will be true. If that is so, given that redefinition \( V \) is correct, for any normal case in which there is an actual audience the fulfillment of the definiens of \( IV(B) \) will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for \( U \)'s having meant that \(*\psi p\).

VI. Conclusion

I see some grounds for hoping that, by paying serious attention to the relation between nonnatural and natural meaning, one might be able not only to reach a simplified account of utterer's occasion-meaning, but also to show that any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs, must embody, as its key-concept, a concept possessing approximately the features which I ascribe to the concept of utterer's occasion-meaning. But such an endeavor lies beyond the scope of this paper.

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